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Conclusion
Because of the vital public interest in a coordinated transportation system,
the provisions of the Act relating to motor carriers are certainly desirable. It
is concededly futile to seek unity in this field by regulating a part of it, while
permitting the rest to operate unhindered. To demand a coordinated system
is to demand control of all. However, in attempting to achieve this desired
result, it is unfortunate that the legislators did not follow more closely the
approved Texas statute. By rejecting the tried for the untried, they have raised
a legal barrier which may prove difficult to surmount in the event of a consti-
tutional test. In addition, some of the provisions of the Act have a potentiality
for contravening the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment,
but a well considered course of action on the part of the Commission may
prevent these potentialities from becoming realities. Ultimately, then, much of
the success of Pennsylvania's regulation of contract carriers will depend upon
an administration that is judicious and tempered with practicality.
S.T.M.
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Taxation of Contributions of Appreciated Property to Partnership
Capital in Kind
Because of its anomalous characteristics, the partnership has proved trouble-
some in the field of taxation as well as in other branches of the law.1 From an
early stage, it has been deemed advisable, for purposes of taxation of income, to
disregard the entity theory treating partnerships as juristic persons similar to
corporations, and to adopt the aggregate theory piercing the collective form to the
individual partners.2 Thus income to a partnership has been treated in the Reve-
nue Acts as income to the individual partners,3 and transfers of property as
between partnership and partners have been ignored by the Treasury Depart-
ment for purposes of taxation,4 since they are deemed analogous to a transfer
of a man's property to himself.5 This treatment has proved satisfactory in the
ordinary case of contributions in cash to partnership capital, but serious diffi-
culties have been encountered in the case of contribution of capital in the form
of property, the value of which has appreciated over cost or other basis to the
transferor at the time of contribution.
For example, A contributes property worth $ioo,ooo to a partnership, the
basis of the property in his hands being $5o,ooo. B contributes $ioo,ooo in
cash. A and B each receive a half interest in the "capital" contributed and in
future earnings. Is A to be taxed on the "pre-partnership" appreciation of
i. The problem of the proper treatment of the partner-partnership relationship has been
particularly difficult in connection with the Bankruptcy Act in considering whether discharge
of one discharged the other. See Note (1929) 29 COL. L. REv. 1134.
2. See 4 PAUL & MERTEN S, LAw OF FEoP.AL INCOME TAxATioN (1934) § 33.0.
3. 49 STAT. 1709 (1936), 26 U. S. C. A. § 18I (934) : "Individuals carrying on business
in partnership shall be liable for income tax only in their individual capacity." See historical
note to the effect that identical or similar provisions have appeared in the REVNUE AcTs of
1932, 1928, 1926, 1924, 1921, ipr8, 1917, i96, and 1913. THE EXCESs-PRoFITS TAx AcT OF
1917 (§ 201) imposed a tax on partnerships as such, but was abandoned the following year.
4 PAUL & MERTENS, op. cit. supra note 2, § 33.01, n. I.
4. Contributions to paitnerships: G. C. M. 10092, XI-i Cum. BULL. 114 (1932); Mim.
4311, XIV-i CuM. BtL. 208 (935). 1,
5. See MAGTLr, TAxAILE INCOME (1936) ii9, quoting T. B. R. 34, i CuM. BtrU. 46
(9I9).
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$50,000 at the time he contributes the property to the firm? If not, and the
partnership sells the property for $ioo,ooo, may the "pre-partnership" apprecia-
tion of $5o,ooo be taxed at that time, or does the partnership have a basis of the
value at the time of contribution, so that the "pre-partnership" appreciation
escapes taxation until the firm is liquidated and dissolved? These and innumer-
able related problems have troubled the Treasury Department and the taxpayer
for years, and it appears that no solution satisfactory in either the legal or the
practical sense has yet been discovered.
The Present Law and Its Application
The Revenue Act of 1936 provides that the basis of property contributed
to a partnership ". . shall be the same as it would have been in the hands of
the transferor, increased in the amount of gain or decreased in the amount of
loss recognized to the transferor upon such transfer under the law applicable to
the year in which the transfer was made. . . ." 1 The Treasury Department
has taken the position that no gain or loss is recognized to the transferor upon
such a transfer, because no gain or loss is realized by him at that time.7 Thus,
although the value of the property at the time of contribution to the partnership
determines the extent of the transferor's interest in the partnership capital and
may at the same time determine the extent of his interest in partnership profits,8
the Treasury Department disregards the value for purposes of taxation until
the property is subsequently sold by the partnership. Upon such disposition,
the transferor is taxed upon the whole of the "unrealized" appreciation prior to
contribution or upon as much thereof as the partnership "realizes" from the sale,
apparently on the theory that by force of the partnership agreement,10 this part
of the gain is the transferor's "distributive share, whether distributed or not, of
the net income of the partnership for the taxable year"."1 The alternative, which
the Treasury Department apparently has not chosen to adopt,12 would be to tax
the appreciation prior to contribution, insofar as it was "realized" at the time of
sale, to all the partners according to their proportionate shares of the earnings.13
This scheme would more easily fit in with the statutory provision for taxing
6. 49 STAT. 1682, 26 U. S. C. A. § 113 (3) (Supp. 1936).
7. U. S. Treas. Reg. 94, Art. 113 (a) (13)-1: "The basis of property contributed in kind
by a partner to partnership capital . . ., is cost or other basis thereof to the contributing
partner." The regulation assumes that no gain or loss is "recognized to the transferor upon
such a transfer"; since there is no non-recognition provision in the statute covering this type
of case, the ruling must be based on the assumption that no gain or loss is realized, since non-
recognition is authorized only where the statute expressly provides for it. See G. C. M.
IOO92, XI-I Cum. BuLL. 114, 115 (1932) ; MILLER, HENDRICKS & EVERETT, REORGANIzATIONS
AND OTHER EXCHANGES IN INcOME TAXATION (93) 248.
8. See GR-3H3 & KATz, ACCOUNTING IN LAW PR1cncE (1932) § 45.
9. U. S. Treas. Reg. 94, Art. 113 (a) (13)-1: ". . . On sale or other disposition of such
contributed property by the partnership the gain or loss, determined on such transferred
basis . . ." (i. e. basis of the transferor) shall be taxed.
io. U. S. Treas. Reg. 94, Art. 113 (a) (3)-1: The gain". . . shall be prorated in de-
termining the distributive shares of the partners according to their gain or loss ratios on the
disposition of a partnership asset under the partnership agreement". The regulation does not
make it clear that the contributing partner is to be taxed on all the gain representing appreci-
ation prior to contribution. Such a view was taken by the Treasury Department, however,
in explaining a regulation under the 1928 Act which approximated the basis provisions incor-
porated in § 113 (13) of the Revenue Acts of 1934 and 1936. See G. C. M. ioo92, XI-i CuM.
BuLL. 114, 115 (1932); Min. 4311, XIV-I Cum. BuLL. 208 (935).
I. 49 STAT. 1709 (1936), 26 U. S. C. A. § 182 (1934).
12. See supra note Io.
13. See (1934) 34 COL. L. Rv. 1562, 1563, to the effect that a literal interpretation of the
provisions in the I934 Act (the same as those in the 1936 Act) would indicate a tax on all
the partners.
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each partner on his share of partnership income,1 4 but its constitutionality under
the due process clause is doubtful in view of the Supreme Court's condemnation
of taxing one man on another man's income.1 5 Further, it seems clear that the
present solution is the more equitable 16 although, of course, it too might be open
to constitutional objections.
Validity of the Present Law as Interpreted
It seems clear that the Revenue Act of 1936 as interpreted by the Treasury
Department is not a satisfactory solution of the problem of taxing contributions
to partnership capital in kind. In the first place, the proposition that a partner
individually realizes income not realized by the other partners on sale of part-
nership property is of doubtful constitutional validity, except in the case where
one person contributes all the capital, the other partners having no interest in
it when the firm is dissolved.17 It is a fundamental principle of partnership law
that a partner has no individual right to specific partnership property,18 but
rather that all the partners have an interest in all the partnership property 9
Thus each partner has a right to share in gain or loss derived from all partner-
ship property to an extent determined by the partnership agreement. It seems
entirely inconsistent with this theory to earmark a specific amount of gain from
a specific piece of partnership property for the purpose of taxing one partner.
Any gain from any partnership property must be a gain to all the partners
according to their shares, and thus no unshared portion of it can properly be
regarded as income to one partner.2 0
It is also questionable whether the interpretation given to the statute by
the Treasury Department is justified, even though it is most equitable. As-
suming that unrealized appreciation prior to contribution can become income to
the partnership when the contributed property is sold, it is doubtful that it could
be considered the transferor's "distributive share" within the terms of the
statute,21 not because it is not to be distributed,22 but because it is difficult to
conceive how a portion of profit allocated entirely to one partner can be properly
considered a share of partnership income.2 3  The Treasury Department early
laid down the rule that income from a particular source could not be allocated
to any one partner,2 ' and the provisions of the present Act do not seem to
14. See supra note ii.
I5. Hoeper v. Wisconsin, 284 U. S. 206 (1931). But cf. Taft v. Bowers, 278 U. S. 47o
(929).
16. See (1934) 34 COL. L. Rav. 1562, 1563, indicating that in view of surtaxes, a tax to
all the partners could be only roughly anticipated.
17. In such a case and only in such a case, the provisions of the REVENUE AcT oF 1936
as explained by treasury regulations seem clearly valid. It appears that in this case, the
partner and the partnership should be regarded as one, for tax purposes, in the case of trans-
fers of property between them.
I8. U~Nro.m PARTNERSHip AcT, § 25 (2) (a) ; this law has been adopted in nineteen
states. 7 UNFoRm LAws ANN. (Supp. 1936) 5.
ig. UNIoRu PARTNERSHip Acr, § 25 (i), referring to this co-ownership as "tenancy in
partnership". See Helvering v. Smith, 9o F. (2d) 59o, 591 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937) (indicating
that the Uniform Act retained the essentials of the common law concepts of partnership) ;
MEcHEM, PARTNERsHIP (899) § 97 (indicating that the common law incidents of partnership
property were essentially the same).
20. See Helvering v. Walbridge, 70 F. (2d) 683, 685 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
21. 49 STAT. 1709 (936), x2 U. S. C. A. § 182 (934).
22. Raymond Guarini, 7 B. T. A. 104 (927). But see Edward B. Archbald, 27 B. T. A.
837, 843 (1933).
23. See Earl v. Commissioner, 38 F. (2d) 965, 967 (C. C. A. Ist, 1930), to the effect
that the word "distributive" is used in the sense of proportionate. Under this interpretation,
the transferor could only be taxed on his proportionate share of the profit.
24. 0. D. 14o, I Cum. BULL. 222, Digest A 750.
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authorize a change in this rule.25  Thus it would be desirable to make some
change in the statutory provisions governing these transactions. A provision
for taxation at the time property is contributed to a partnership might be a
suitable solution, 2 especially since it would hasten the time for taxation.
2 7
Proposed Changes in the Present Law
There are compelling reasons to support a theory that when a man transfers
property to a partnership as a capital contribution, he realizes income to the
extent that the value of the interest in partnership assets 28 which he receives
exceeds the cost or other basis of the property which he transfers. In return
for the property contributed, in the ordinary case, the contributing partner re-
ceives an assignable right 2' to be repaid the amount of his capital contribution
or the share of it remaining out of partnership assets before profits and surplus
are shared on dissolution. 0 Thus, assuming that other partners contribute to
the assets, he receives in exchange for his interest in specific property a propor-
tional interest in all partnership property from which he is entitled to receive
on dissolution the amount of capital which he contributed or the proportional
share thereof remaining.31 Unless the partnership agreement otherwise stipu-
lates, a partnership may be dissolved by the express will of any partner at any
time. 2 Thus, the right to a return of contributed capital out of partnership
capital at the time of dissolution is a thing of very real value, though its value
may be lowered by the fact that the right may not ripen until a period of time
stipulated in the partnership agreement has elapsed. 3 It seems unnecessary for
tax purposes to consider whether a partner's interest in partnership assets is a
right against the firm regarded as a legal "entity" or a right against the other
partners. The fact remains that the right is property 24 received in exchange
for other property, and represents realized gain insofar as its value exceeds the
value of the property contributed. 35
The Supreme Court has decided that where a person exchanges an ap-
preciated asset for other property, he.receives income. Thus in Marr v. United
25. Edward B. Archbald, 27 B. T. A. 837, 842 (1933), af'd, 7o F. (2d) 72o (C. C. A.
2d, 1934), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 594 (934).
26. The suggested rule as to contributions could be changed merely by a change in treas-
ury regulations, but a change in the statute would be more desirable, since new provisions
could remove vagueness of the existing law and at the same time prevent the necessity of the
Treasury Department's adoption of a theory inconsistent with its present one. But see Lang-
staff v. Lucas, 9 F. (2d) 691, 693 (W. D. Ky. 1925), to the effect that incorrect treasury
regulations do not estop the government from asserting a proper tax.
27. See (934) 34 COL. L. REv. 1562, 1563.
28. The interest properly taxable at the time of contribution to assets is the interest in
partnership assets, i. e., the right to a share of the assets remaining on dissolution. The right
to share in profits which may be given either in return for contribution of capital or for
future services (see GRAHAM & KATZ, ACCOUNTING IN LAW PRACTICE (1932) § 45) must be
considered in valuing the interest in partnership assets, however, since potential profits and
losses of the firm to be shared by the partners must of necessity affect partnership capital and
hence each partner's interest therein.
29. To the effect that the right is assignable see UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT,
§§25 (2) (b) and Comm'rs' note thereto, 27 (2) ; MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP (I899) § 99.
30. "Dissolution" is used here and below in the sense of winding up. See UNIFORM PART-
NERSHIP ACT, § 25 (2) (b) and Comm'rs' note thereto; MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP (1899) § 98.
31. See MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP (1899) § 97.
32. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT, §§ 3 (I) (b), 37.
33. Id. §§ 31 (1) (a), 37. Even where there is a time specified, dissolution may be
brought about at any time if all the partners consent, § 31 (I) (c).
34. THE UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT expressly so provides in § 26. The section seems
to limit this "interest in the partnership" to the right to share in profits and surplus, but the
Comm'rs' note to § 25 (2) (b) indicates that it also includes the right to a share of the part-
nership "capital" on winding up.
35. See MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME (1936) 116, 118.
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States,30 where shareholders in a New Jersey corporation exchanged their shares
for shares in a new Delaware corporation to which the assets of the New Jersey
corporation had been transferred, it was held that they received income to the
extent that the value of the shares received exceeded the cost or other basis of
the old shares. A more striking analogy to the situation in question is found in
the cases of exchanges between closed corporations and their shareholders. It
has been held that where a man transfers property to a corporation in exchange
for all its shares, he may realize taxable gain 37 because he has received new
interests which may be treated as income for tax purposes. A gain severed
from capital in the strictest sense is no longer a prerequisite to realization of
income if the taxpayer receives different interests from those which he formerly
possessed. 38 Thus in Burnet v. Commonwealth Improvement Co.,39 the Supreme
Court held that where a sole shareholder exchanged debentures for property
held by the corporation, a taxable gain resulted since the corporation was a
separate entity even though owned by a single shareholder.40
It would seem that if a shareholder realizes income from exchanges with a
corporation of which he may or may not be sole owner, a partner should realize
income from a similar transaction, except in the case where he alone contributes
capital and has a right to it on dissolution.4 1  In return for his contribution of
property, he receives an undivided proportional interest in property contributed
by himself and the other partners which he can assert on liquidation, plus a
share in partnership profits.4 2  Certainly, as a result of his contribution, he
receives an interest sufficiently new to constitute income.
However, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has unsuccessfully as-
serted such a claim. In Helvering v. Walbridge,43 it was decided that where a
inan contributes to a partnership property which has appreciated in value, he
realizes no taxable gain at the time of contribution. The principal ground for
this decision was that the interest received by the contributor had no "fair
market value" as required by the statute.4 4  In view of the Treasury Depart-
36. 268 U. S. 536 (3925), 2o ILL. L. RE V. 6oi (1926).
37. Insurance Title & Guarantee Co. v. Comm'r, 36 F. (2d) 842 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929),
oert. denied, 281 U. S. 748 (1930) ; S. R. Roseburg, x3 B. T. A. 5o3 (1928) ; U. S. Treas.
Reg. 45, Art. 3566, as amended in T. D. 2924, I CuI. BULL. 44. But cf. Tsivoglou v. United
States, 31 F. (2d) 7o6 (C. C. A. Ist, 1929) ; Schoenheit v. Lucas, 44 F. (2d) 476 (C. C. A.
4th, 1930) (denying that there was a realization of gain or loss on such an exchange because
the shares received had no "fair market value" and the change of interest was merely"formal").
38. See MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME (1936) o5.
39. 287 U. S. 4,5 (1932).
40. Id. at 419.
41. See mcpra note 28. In the case where one partner contributes all the capital and is
alone entitled to it on dissolution, it would seem impossible to arrive at the conclusion that
the interest in the partnership capital which he receives is so different from his interest in the
property which he contributed that he can be said to have realized income. It would seem
unwise to push the analogy to transfer of property to a corporation in return for all its shares
this far, since partnerships are not commonly regarded as entities but rather as a group of
individuals. Probably the present law and regulations should be continued for this type of
case.
42. See supra note 28, indicating that it is necessary to consider this right to share in
partnership profits in valuing the interest in partnership capital received for the purpose of
taxing the transferor at the time of contribution.
43. 70 F. (2d) 683 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 594 (I934).
44. 49 STAT. 1678 (3936), 26 U. S. C. A. § III (b) and note (I934) : "The amount re-
alized from the sale or other disposition of property shall be the sum of any money received
plus the fair market value of the property (other than money) received." The same pro-
vision has appeared in every act since 1924. The i918 Act referred to "fair market value, if
any"; the 1921 Act used the expression "readily realizable market value"; see PAUL, STUDIES
rK FEDERAL TAXATION (937) i68.
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ment's attitude that only in rare cases does property have no fair market value 45
and in light of the realities of the case, the holding of the Walbridge case in this
respect seems extremely doubtful. There seems to be no doubt that by virtue of
the Revenue Act, the property received must have a "fair market value" for
taxable gain to be realized. Whether or not this is a constitutional limitation,
it is a necessary administrative prerequisite to determining the extent of the
gain realized.48 The meaning of the expression is vague and has been inter-
preted as meaning intrinsic value.4 7  To avoid unnecessary stress on either the
word "fair" or the word "market", the courts have created the fiction of the
willing buyer and the willing seller with reasonable knowledge of all the facts
as a standard. 48  Determination of value according to this vague standard is a
difficult task since many elements must be weighed, 49 but the existence of the
difficulty does not indicate the absence of fair market value. It is indeed difficult
to see why a right to receive a certain proportion of assets remaining on dissolu-
tion and to share in earnings is any less likely to have a fair market value in the
case of a partnership than in the case of a corporation, even though partnership
interests are less often bought and sold than corporate shares. In the case of
shares, if there is no market to establish a price (which in itself is only evidence
of "fair market value"), 50 courts are willing to look at other indications of value
such as the assets and liabilities of the corporation.51 Further it is not uncom-
mon to regard the value of the property exchanged for the shares as prima fade
evidence of the value of the shares themselves.5 2 It would seem that similar
methods could easily be used in determining the "fair market value" of a part-
nership interest. Therefore it is submitted that a statutory provision for taxing
partners on their gains at the time of contribution of property to the partnership
would be valid under the Sixteenth Amendment and feasible from an adminis-
trative point of view.
Assuming, that income is realized at the time of contribution of property to
a partnership,58 but that it is not desirable to tax it at that time because of the
difficulty of determining the "fair market value" of a partnership interest, the
partners could be taxed when the partnership sells the property. At that time
they could be taxed on their proportional shares of appreciation accruing prior
to contribution insofar as it is "realized" on sale and insofar as it represents
gain to them over that part of the basis of their partnership interest properly
allocable to that property. A statutory provision for non-recognition of gain or
loss on contribution of property in exchange for a partnership interest would
45. U. S. Treas. Reg. 94, Art. uii-i.
46. MAGIL , TAXABLE INCOME (1936) o.
47. Id. at 2o3; see also 2 BONBRIGHT, VAI.UATION OF PROPERTY (1937) 98_ (indicating
that "fair market value" as interpreted means neither value to the owner nor price at which
the property could be sold, but an indefinite value somewhere in between the two).
48. See PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION (1937) 193; I BoNBRIGHT, op. cit. supra
note 47, at 6o (criticizing the occasional use of this fiction in order to assume a market that
doesn't exist and value property according to worth to the owner).
49. See PAUL, op. cit. supra note 48, at 178.
5o. U. S. Treas. Reg. 94, Art. 113 (a) (14)-I.
51. U. S. Treas. Reg. 94, Art. 113 (a) (14)-1; Phillips v. United States, 12 F. (2d) 598,
603 (W. D. Pa. 1926), rev'd on other grounds, 24 F. (2d) 195 (C. C. A. 3d, 1928) ; PAUL,
op. cit. mtpra note 48, at 210.
52. See William Ziegler, Jr., 3 B. T. A. i86, 192 (1924) ; T. B. Noble, 12 B. T. A. 1419,
1436 (1928). Probably it would be desirable to have a provision to the effect that the value
of the property contributed is prima facie evidence of the value of the partnership interest
received.
53. This assumption may be ill-founded, although it seems to be sound. But even if it
is not warranted, the plan submitted below may still be valid under the theory expounded in
the Walbridge case that when the partnership sells the property, the partners realize income
to the extent that their share of the proceeds exceeds their share of the original cost. See
Helvering v. Walbridge, 70 F. (2d) 683, 685 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
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be necessary. It could then be provided that the basis to the partnership of
contributed property should be the agreed value, or, in the absence of a valuation
in the partnership agreement, the fair market value of the property contributed.
It could further be provided that when the property is sold by the partnership,
the partners should be taxed, as at present, on their distributive shares of part-
nership income computed on that basis. It is suggested that the partners be
given a basis for partnership property contributed in kind different from that of
the partnership; this basis would be the same as that given under the present
Act to partners who receive property in kind, namely, that part of the basis of
their partnership interest properly allocable to such property.54 This is the true
cost of each partner's share in that specific piece of partnership capital. The
partners would then be taxed on the difference between this basis and their
share of that part of the proceeds of the sale that was not taxed to them as part-
nership income. This procedure is merely a recognition of the fact that what
may be capital to the partnership may be income to the partners. Each partner
will thus be taxed on the difference between his distributive share of this partner-
ship "capital" and the cost to him of that share.55 In Helvering v. Walbridge,
it is indicated that it might be within the bounds of the Sixteenth Amendment
"to say that a partner had 'realized' a 'gain' based upon the difference between
his proportion of the selling price and the same proportion of his original cost",5"
at the time of sale by the partnership of property contributed in kind.5 7
It might be argued against this proposal that it is improper to tax part-
ners on their share of partnership "capital", since it is not distributable until
dissolution. But the provision for taxing a distributive share of partnership
income whether distributed or not has been upheld even in cases where that
share was to be used for partnership "capital".5 s Thus it would seem that a
partner can realize a gain from a partnership transaction even though he will
not individually receive the proceeds until dissolution of the firm. Assuming
that income is realized by the contributing partner when property is contributed,
the argument that postponement of a tax on realized income is a denial of due
54. 49 STAT. 1682 (1936), 26 U. S. C. A. § xi3 (a) (13) (1934).
55. E. g., A contributes property costing $6oooo at an agreed value of $12,0ooo. B con-
tributes property costing $9o,ooo at an agreed value of $120,000. C contributes $i20,000 in
cash. Each partner has a I/3 interest in capital and profits. A's property is sold by the part-
nership for $220,000. Of this amount $iooooo represents partnership earnings and would
be taxed as such equally to the three partners. The remaining $120,000 is partnership "capi-
tal" and represents gain taxable to the individual partners insofar as their proportionate
shares of it exceed their proportionate cost for those shares. A's basis as to that property
is 1/3 of the cost of his interest or $2,ooo; his proportionate share is 1/3 of $120,000 or
$4o,o0o; hence $20,000 is taxed as gain to A. B's basis as to that property is 1/3 of the cost of
his interest or $3o,ooo; his proportionate share is 1/3 of $120,000 or $40,000; hence $Io,ooo is
taxed as gain to B. C's basis as to that property is 1/3 of the cost of his interest or $40,000;
his proportionate share is 1/3 of $120,000 or $4oooo; hence C has realized no taxable gain.
Of course, the basis of each partner's interest would be increased over his original basis to the
extent of gain on which he is taxed in this manner, so that he woild not be again taxed on
that gain when the firm dissolved.
56. See Helvering v. Walbridge, 7o F. (2d) 683, 685 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
57. Id. at 685. The court apparently felt that the basis of the property sold would be, as to
the non-contributing partners, their share either of cost to the contributor or of fair market value
at the time of contribution. It is submitted that, conceding that partners can have different
bases as to specific firm property, the most satisfactory solution is to allocate the basis of each
partner's capital contribution to all property contributed to the firm as has been suggested above.
To do this is to treat the transaction realistically. The cost to each partner of his interest in
a specific partnership asset contributed in kind is very likely to be different from that of the
other partners and of the firm. It is suggested that it is far more desirable to treat each
partner individually for this purpose than to attempt the impossible task of working out a fair
scheme under some fictional collective basis which can be applied to partners and partnership
alike.
58. Raymond Guarini, 7 B. T. A. 104 (1927) ; Maxwell E. Bessell, 3 B. T. A. 567 (1926).
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process might also be made. But the fact that similar provisions for non-recog-
nition have not been successfully attacked would seem to indicate that the argu-
ment is unfounded.59
Inasmuch as the present statutory provisions, as interpreted, are in all
probability invalid and the door is thus open for tax avoidance,60 it would seem
important that a new well-drafted and explicit measure be adopted. Of the two
suggested plans, the plan of non-recognition of gain or loss at the time of con-
tribution of property in kind and taxation of the partners at the time of sale by
the partnership seems inferior because it delays the tax and because, while it is
apparently sounder in legal theory than the present provisions, it fails to eliminate
the practical difficulties which they present. 61  On the other hand, the plan of
taxing the contributor at the time of contribution to the partnership seems more
desirable since it hastens the time for taxation 612 and is less difficult to apply. In
any event, the theoretical and practical difficulties inherent in the present provi-
sions for taxing contributions of appreciated partnership capital in kind indicate
the desirability of discarding legal concepts of partnerships useless for this pur-
pose, and, with due regard for the limitations of the Sixteenth Amendment,"
of adopting a plan of taxation that will be most convenient for the government
and the taxpayer. 64
G. W. R., Jr.
Validity of Subpoenas Duces Tecum Issued by Federal
Administrative Bodies
"For three hundred years it has now been recognized as a fundamental
maxim that the public . . . has a right to every man's evidence." I The
power to compel testimony, though absolutely essential to the proper functioning
of courts designed to adjudicate conflicting private rights, necessarily involved
encroachments upon the individual's jealously guarded private rights. It is not
strange, therefore, that the duty to appear as a witness and testify 2 was once
enforceable only before a judicial tribunal,3 and that every effort to extend the
power of subpcena has met with constant opposition. The attempt to vest
59. Newman, Saunders & Co. v. United States, 36 F. (2d) lOO9 (Ct. Cl. 1929), cert. denied,
281 U. S. 76o (1930) ; Osburn California Corp. v. Welch, 39 F. (2d) 41 (C. C. A. 9th, 193o),
cert. denied, 282 U. S. 85o (1930). See MILLER, HENDRICKS & EvEETT, REORGANIZATIONS
AND OTHER EXCHANGES IN INCOME TAXATION (1931) § 206; MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME
(1936) 147.
6o. Chisholm v. Commissioner, 79 F. (2d) 14 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S.
641 (935). See PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION (937) 126.
61. See Edward B. Archbald, 27 B. T. A. 837, 843 (1933), criticizing the requirement that
for tax purposes alone partnership accounts carry complicated computations unconnected with
partnership affairs. The suggested provision would require double computations, those to de-
termine partnership gains-and those to determine gains of the individual partners.
62. See (934) 34 COL. L. REv. 1562, 1563.
63. Although it seems highly improbable, it is possible that the courts might find that no
individual realizes gain or loss at the time of contribution of property to the partnership or at
the time of sale by it. If such should be the case, taxation of these gains could only take
place when the partner received cash for his interest or for property received by virtue of it.
64. See Note (932) 45 HARv. L. REV. 1072, 1077 (to the effect that the courts emphasize
convenience in choosing the proper time for taxation).
I. 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2192.
2. There is no dispute as to the existence of this general duty. See Blair v. United
States, 250 U. S. 273, 281 (I919), and authorities cited in 4 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 2192,
2193.
3. Lilienthal, The Power of Governmental Agencies to Compel Testimony (1926) 39
HAnv. L. REV. 694, 695.
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various administrative agencies of the federal government with this power has
proved to be no exception.
The increased demands for government regulation and control of business
that followed in the wake of the industrial development of the country gave rise
to numerous administrative bodies created to assist in the enactment and en-
forcement of regulatory statutes. Thus, to carry out the purposes of the Inter-
state Commerce Act of 1887,4 the Interstate Commerce Commission was author-
ized to conduct hearings and investigations, with the power "to require by
subpoena, the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of all
books, papers, . . . and documents relating to any matter under investiga-
tion" s. To compel a contumacious witness to comply with its subpcena, the Com-
mission may seek the aid of the federal courts; and for non-compliance with the
court order, the witness may be cited for contempt.6 Subsequent regulatory
statutes enacted by Congress have rarely failed to provide for similar powers to
aid an administrative agency in its duties of regulation and investigation.'
Since the establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission, several
constitutional objections have been advanced against the validity of adminis-
trative subpcenas. It was argued that the courts were without authority to come
to the aid of administrative bodies because the issue was not a case or contro-
versy within the meaning of Article III of the Constitution. The use of adminis-
trative subpcenas was attacked further on the ground that it violated the con-
stitutionally protected privilege against self-incrimination,' while subpcenas duces
tecum, requiring the production of documentary evidence, were assailed as con-
stituting unreasonable searches and seizures contrary to the Fourth Amend-
ment.'
The procedural pattern designed by the framers of the Interstate Commerce
Act was declared unconstitutional within one year of its enactment. 10 "Cases"
or "controversies" over which the judicial power of the courts extended, said
4. 24 STAT. 379 (1887), 49 U. S. C. A. § i (1929).
5. Id. at 383, 49 U. S. C. A. § ii.
6. Id. at 383, 49 U. S. C. A. § 12. Without the aid of the courts, the power of subpoena
would be useless in the hands of the commission inasmuch as it is powerless in itself to punish
for contempt. See Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447, 485 (894). For
criticism of this principle, see Pillsbury, Administrative Tribunals (923) 36 HARV. L. Rzv.
405, 583, 59o. In addition to this means of direct compulsion, other types of administrative
sanctions have been given such investigatory bodies. See Note (937) 51 HAV. L. RFv. 312.
7. Among the more important agencies with such powers are: Federal Communications
Commission, 48 STAT. io96 (934), 47 U. S. C. A. § 409 (Supp. 1937) ; Federal Power Com-
mission, 49 STAT. 856 (1935), i6 U. S. C. A. § 825f (Supp. 1937) ; Federal Trade Commission,
38 STAT. 722 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. § 49 (1927) ; National Labor Relations Board, 49 STAT.
456 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 16i (Supp. 1937) ; Securities Exchange Commission, 48 STAT.
899 (1934), 15 U. S. C. A. § 78u (Supp. 1937).
8. U. S. CoNsT. Amend. V.
9. A fourth objection, namely, that such testimonial compulsion by a non-judicial body is
a deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law, has occasionally been ad-
vanced. The courts have never directly passed upon this question, avoiding it through con-
struction of the statutes involved whenever the issue has been raised. A thorough discussion
of the problem and of this treatment by the courts can be found in Handler, Constitutionality
of Investigations by the Federal Trade Commission (1928) 28 COL. L. REv. 708, 905, 924;
Lilienthal, supra note 3, at 708-720. See also Bartlett Frazier Co. v. Hyde, 65 F. (2d) 350,
352 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933), cert. denied, 290 U. S. 654 (933), where it was said that "the con-
tention that by requiring these reports and permitting these investigations without first giving
an opportunty to be heard is violative of the constitutional 'due process' provision . . . does
not appeal to us."
IO. In re Pacific Ry. Comm., 32 Fed. 241 (C. C. N. D. Cal. 1887). The commission in-
volved in this case was not the I. C. C. but one created in the same year to investigate certain
government aided interstate railroads. See 24 STAT. 488 (1887). The procedure for the en-
forcement of subpoenas was, however, exactly the same as that provided for in the Interstate
Commerce Act.
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Justice Field, meant claims of litigants brought for determination by regular
judicial proceedings instituted for the "protection or enforcement of rights, or
the prevention, redress, or punishment of wrongs".1 ' The provision authorizing
the courts to come to the aid of a commission by compelling a recalcitrant wit-
ness to obey the subpoena was therefore void inasmuch as the petition of an
administrative agency, which was a mere board of inquiry without power to
determine rights of those whose affairs it investigated, did not present a claim
of a litigant. This objection, however, was disposed of by the Supreme Court
in Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson,'2 where it was pointed out that
the Interstate Commerce Act had imposed upon every citizen a legal duty to
appear and testify when summoned by the Commission. If he refuses, and the
aid of the courts is sought, there is a case within the meaning of Article III of
the Constitution, the issue being "whether the Commission is entitled to the
evidence it seeks or whether the refusal of the witness is or is not in violation
of his duty or in derogation of the rights of the United States, seeking to execute
a power expressly granted by Congress". 13 Thus, by judicial decision, this first
objection to the extended use of the subpoena was eliminated.
Since regulatory statutes make violations thereof misdemeanors punishable
by fine or imprisonment, witnesses summoned by administrative commissions
sought to avoid the burden of testifying or of producing the required documents
by falling back upon the protection of the Fifth Amendment, which provides
that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself in any criminal
case. In an effort to circumvent this constitutional privilege, which would have
been a serious obstacle to the effective execution of its administrative duties, the
Interstate Commerce Commission relied at first upon a statute providing that
no evidence obtained from a witness in a judicial proceeding should in any
manner be used against him in any criminal prosecution' z4  This immunity,
however, did not protect a witness from prosecution and conviction through
other evidence, discovered indirectly through disclosures made by him in his
testimony. Accordingly, this objection was recognized by the Court in Counsel-
man v. Hitchcock,'5 subsequent to which the Interstate Commerce Act was
amended in 1893 to provide that "no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to
any penalty or forfeiture for . . . any transaction . . . concerning which he
may testify or produce evidence before the commission in obedience to its sub-
pcena".' 6 This absolute immunity from future prosecution successfully avoided
the objection against disclosure of self-incriminating evidence in proceedings
before an administrative commission; 1 7 consequently such a provision has been
incorporated in all subsequent regulatory acts.' The privilege, however, still
must be claimed,' 9 for testimony once given may not be questioned as violative
ii. 32 Fed. 241, 255 (C. C. N. D. Cal. 1887).
12. 154 U. S. 447 (1894). This decision reversed the circuit court, In re Interstate Com-
merce Comm., 53 Fed. 476 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1892), which had followed the Pacific Ry. Comm.
case.
13. 154 U. S. 447, 476 (1894).
14. 15 STAT. 37 (1868).
15. 142 U. S. 547 (1892).
16. 27 STAT. 443 (893), 49 U. S. C. A. § 46 (1929).
17. Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591 (1896) (upholding the Act).
I8. See statutes cited supra note 7.
19. United States v. Skinner, 218 Fed. 870 (S. D. N. Y. 1914) ; Pandolfo v. Biddle, 8 F.
(:2d) 142 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925). In the more recent statutes, this principle is included in the
immunity clause. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 900 (1934), 15 U. S. C. A.
§ 78u (d) (Supp. 1937). Although it may seem logically inconsistent to say that a privilege
which has been removed must still be claimed, this is well-settled. The reason for the re-
quirement is that the legislature intended to protect only those unwilling to testify; an obvious
result is a trap for the unsuspecting. See State v. Grosnickle, 189 Wis. 17, 206 N. W. 895
(1926), 3 Wis. L. REV. 485; 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2282.
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of the constitutional privilege so long as an opportunity has been given the
witness to claim it.20 Furthermore, the immunity extends only to natural per-
sons, the law being well settled that a corporation cannot claim protection against
furnishing self-incriminating evidence.
2 1
A still fertile source of litigation is to be found in the power of the adminis-
trative tribunal to require the production of documentary evidence. The sub-
pcena duces tecum, a court order through which books and papers are procured,
is open to the objection of invading the protection of the Fourth Amendment
against unreasonable searches and seizures; 22 the more common type of sub-
pcena is not concerned with such a problem. Although at first it may not be clear
how such an order operates either as a search or seizure, an explanation lies in the
history of judicial decisions. The Constitutional prohibition was the offspring of
the reaction both in America and England against the use of writs of assistance
and general warrants by government officials as an excuse for rummaging
through the home or possessions of a suspected lawbreaker in search for incrim-
inating evidence.23  The denunciation of this practice by Lord Camden in the
leading case of Entick v. Carrington 24 provided the basis for future decisions con-
cerning "unreasonable searches and seizures". In that case general warrants
were condemned as unreasonable because they lacked particularity in the descrip-
tion of the thing to be seized and because they authorized a search for evidentiary
matters, which were not amenable to search and seizure even under a warrant
inasmuch as such a practice would violate the privilege against self-incrimination.
As the Supreme Court in Boyd v. United States 2 and Hale v. Henkel2 6 ex-
tended the prohibition of the Fourth Amendment to the use of subpoenas duces
tecum, the common law limitations surrounding the use of search warrants were
extended with it. In the latter case, a subpoena was issued by a grand jury
requiring production of all understandings, contracts, or correspondence be-
tween a corporation and six other companies. In holding the sweeping terms
of the order violative of the Fourth Amendment, the Court pointed out that the
substance of the offense being the compulsory production of private papers, "a
general subpoena of this description is equally indefensible as a search warrant
would be if couched in similar terms".2 7 The inference made by the Court, how-
ever, was that subpoenas duces tecum describing specifically the documents re-
quired would be consistent with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment if
material to the matter under investigation. Thus, the Constitutional protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures was extended beyond mere physical
invasion or trespass, and today subpcenas duces tecum are condemned as un-
reasonable searches or seizures if they either compel the production of incrim-
inating evidence or are too broad and indefinite in scope. Only the latter, how-
ever, stands as an effective restriction on the issuance of these orders by ad-
ministrative tribunals in view of the established practice of including immunity
clauses in the statutes authorizing the use of subpcenas by such bodies.
20. United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U. S. 1O3, 113
(1927).
21. Hale v. Henkel, 2O U. S. 43 (19o6) ; Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361 (1911).
22. U. S. CONsT. Amend. IV.
23. For general discussion of the judicial treatment of the privilege against unreasonable
searches and seizures, see Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures (1921) 34 HAv. L.
R-v. 361; Fraenkel, Recent Developments in the Law of Search and Seizure (1928) 13 MINI.
L. REv. i; Handler, supra note 9, at 91o; Note (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 81g, 824.
24. 19 How. St. Tr. 1O29 (1765).
25. 116 U. S. 616 (1886). For discussion and criticism of the doctrine of this case in so
far as it relates to the admissibility of evidence illegally obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, see 4 WIGmoRF, EviDENcE § 2184.
26. 201 U. S. 43 (19o6).
27. Id. at 77.
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The instant problem, therefore, is to determine when the courts will declare
invalid a subpcena on the ground that it is too broad or indefinite. In attempting
to answer this question, it must be noted that the investigatory functions of an
administrative commission fall into two general types: (i) quasi-judicial or
those hearings conducted when complaints have been made alleging a violation
of the statute, and (2) non-judicial fact-finding inquiries,2 8 undertaken by the
commission either of its own volition or at the instigation of Congress or of the
executive department. This distinction has been emphasized by the Courts in
determining the validity of administrative subpoenas.
Inasmuch as administrative agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial
functions are analogous to grand juries investigating specific breaches of the
law, a brief survey of the cases involving subpoenas issued by the latter may
prove to be helpful. In Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont,29 decided two
years after Hale v. Henkel, it was pointed out that to specify each particular
document required would be both impracticable and even impossible, and that a
subpoena calling for all books and papers between certain dates would be suffi-
cient. Numerous other subpoenas, following this pattern, were sustained by the
courts in subsequent decisions as not unreasonable searches and seizures, pro-
vided that the information sought appeared to be relevant to the matter under
investigation. 0 And in view of the comprehensiveness of the subpcena declared
valid in the recent case of Brown v. United States,81 it seems clear that the
courts intend to deal with the test of reasonableness most liberally, thereby pre-
serving the efficiency of the investigating body.
Inasmuch as administrative commissions engaged in the hearing or in-
vestigation of formal complaints are acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, it is
logical that their subpoenas should be governed by these same principles of
relevancy and specificity. 2 The question of relevancy, of course, is determined
and delimited by the subject matter of the complaint being investigated; and
the courts, following Hale v. Henkel, will not allow "fishing expeditions" into
the private affairs of individuals or corporations under the guise of a hearing
on a complaint.88 However, when the documents sought are necessary for the
proper disposition of the controversy in issue, and are specified with reasonable
definiteness, it has uniformly been held that the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment have been satisfied. 4
Moreover, several recent cases indicate a marked tendency toward liberality
in the determination of the relevancy of the material requested by subpoena by
these quasi-judicial bodies. In United States v. Union Trust Co.35 a hearing
was being conducted by the Board of Tax Appeals to determine an income tax
deficiency. In the course of the proceedings, a subpcena duces tecum was issued
directing a bank to produce certain contracts of sale, which it was thought had
some bearing on the controversy. In ordering the witness to comply, the dis-
28. Compare particularly the provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 STAT.
719-721 (I914), 15 U. S. C. A. §§45, 46 (1927) ; also those of the Interstate Commerce Act,
24 STAT. 383 (1887), 49 U. S. C. A. §§ 12, 13 (1929).
29. 207 U. S. 541 (19o8).
3o. Wilson v. United States, 228 U. S. 361 (igi) ; Wheeler v. United States, 226 U. S.
478 (1913) ; United States v. Watson, 266 Fed. 736 (N. D. Fla. i92o).
31. 276 U. S. 134 (1927) (grand jury ordered the production of practically the entire
correspondence of a trade association with its members for three years relating to a list of
eighteen different subjects set out in the subpoena).
32. See Langeluttig, Constitutional Limitations on Administrative Power of Investiga-
tion (1934) 28 ILL. L. REV. 508, 509.
33. Ellis v. Interstate Commerce Comm., 237 U. S. 434 (1915).
34. Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447 (1894) ; Interstate Commerce
Comm. v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25 (904).
35. 13 F. Supp. 286 (W. D. Pa. 1936), 35 Micn. L. REv. 510 (1937).
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trict court asserted that "a witness is not entitled to resist a subpcena for mere
incompetency or irrelevancy." To question admissibility, the papers demanded
had to be "so manifestly irrelevant as to make it plain that the subpcena was but
a step in a fishing expedition, and thus an unreasonable search". The court
further intimated that the relevancy requirement would be satisfied even if "a
stretch of the imagination were needed to induce a belief that the papers will
become evidence". 6 Though the case is illustrative of the modem trend, it is
not suggested that this reasoning is either good logic or good law. A too fre-
quent repetition of such loose interpretation of the relevancy requirement would,
in effect, abolish the protection granted by the Fourth Amendment, a result
which is neither desirable nor essential to efficient administrative investigation.
Two recent cases involving the validity of subpoenas issued by the Securities
Exchange Commission in investigating suspected violations of the Securities
Exchange Act, should be considered in conjunction with this opinion. Although
in both cases, the documents sought were in the hands of a third party and the
controversy was decided on other grounds, the courts, by way of dicta, asserted
that in any event the compulsory production of the papers was not open to the
objection of an unreasonable search and seizure. In McMann v. Securities Ex-
change Comm.,37 a subpcena requesting the production of the ledgers of certain
brokers was unsuccessfully resisted by one of the broker's customers. The
court, through Judge Hand, indicated the desirability of liberal construction in
favor of administrative tribunals, yet found it possible to attain this goal without
losing sight of its proper limits. A search is unreasonable "only because it is
out of proportion to the end sought, as when the person served is required to
fetch all his books at once to an exploratory investigation whose purposes and
limits can be determined only as it proceeds". 8 The reaffirmation of this view
in Newfield v. Ryan 19 strengthens the conjecture that the reasonableness of the
subpoenas issued by administrative tribunals will be determined not alone by a
consideration of analogous situations in the past but also by balancing the public
necessity for the investigations against the inconvenience and hardship caused
those who are investigated. Thus, though the limitations of specificity and
relevancy remain to protect the individual from violations of his constitutional
privilege guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment, the courts realize the necessity
for an interpretation of "reasonableness" that will not unduly hinder the ever-
increasing number of quasi-judicial tribunals in the effective execution of their
duties. As long as the exercise of these functions by administrative bodies
casts no greater burden on the citizen than his duty to obey the subpoenas duces
tecum of the ordinary courts, there is no reason why the orders of each should
not be given the same legal force.
The subpcena powers of administrative commissions are not limited to in-
vestigations and hearings relative to specific breaches of the law. Perhaps of
even greater importance today is the work of such bodies in conducting investi-
gations of a purely fact-finding character for the purpose of securing information
either to serve as a basis for further legislation or to aid in the enforcement of
existing law. The provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act are excep-
tionally broad in this respect,40 and equally comprehensive are those of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.41 It is conceded that subpoenas issued by
36. Id. at 287.
37. 87 F. (2d) 377 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937), 50 HARv. L. REv. 698.
38. Id. at 379.
39. 9i F. (2d) 700 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937), cert. denied, 58 Sup. Ct. 34 (1937).
40. 38 STAT. 721 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. §46 (1927).
4L 48 STAT. 899 (1934), i5 U. S. C. A. § 78u (Supp. 1937). The Securities Exchange
Commission is authorized "to investigate any facts, conditions, practices or matters which it
may deem necessary or proper to aid in the enforcement of the provisions of this title, in the
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these bodies in the course of their non-judicial inquiries must be as specific as
those of the courts. Constitutional objections against the unreasonableness of
the use of these subpoenas are, therefore, directed mainly against the relevancy
of the evidence sought. In view of the wide range of possible inquiry that could
be undertaken pursuant to these fact-finding powers, relevancy obviously cannot
be determined as easily as it can be in the case of a specific violation of the law.
Early decisions on the subject had the effect of denying altogether the
powers of administrative agencies to make use of the subpoena in these non-
judicial activities. In Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Commission,42 on the
Commission's own motion an investigation was launched into the activities of
certain carriers suspected of violating the Interstate Commerce Act. An attempt
to force a recalcitrant witness to testify was frustrated by the Supreme Court, on
the ground that Congress had not authorized the compulsion of testimony except
in connection with its quasi-judicial activities. In Justice Holmes' language,
however, there is an unmistakable warning that even had an attempt been made
to confer such wide powers upon the Commission, it would have been unavail-
ing.43 Despite this decision, a similar inquiry, undertaken in response to a
Senate resolution and necessitating the production of the books of a common
carrier, was upheld nine years later by the same Court.44 Although distinguish-
ing the cases by pointing out that the Act had been amended since the Harriman
case, the Court in effect denied that the power of testimonial compulsion was as
limited as Holmes had suggested.
Apparently this reversal of opinion with respect to investigations by the
I. C. C. was not intended to be followed generally. For the Federal Trade Com-
mission continually has been denied the power to compel the production of books
and papers in fact-finding investigations even when undertaken in response to
Congressional resolutions.4 Although the reason given by the courts, as in the
prescribing of rules and regulations thereunder, or in securing information to serve as a basis
for recommending further legislation concerning the matters to which this title relates".
In conjunction with this phase of the note it should be observed that the Federal Trade Com-
mission and the Securities Exchange Commission are also given wide powers to demand ac-
cess to the books and records of the businesses which they regulate. See 38 STAT. 722 (1914),
15 U. S. C. A. §49 (1927) ; and 48 STAT. 897 (1934), 15 U. S. C. A. §78q (Supp. 1937).
The exercise of these powers comes even closer to an invasion of the Fourth Amendment-than
does the use of subpoenas duces tecum, for here there is actual invasion of the premises of the
party investigated. For a discussion of the problems raised by the attempted exercise of such
visitorial powers, see Colclough, Security Exchange Commission's Power of Search (1935)
3 GEo. WAsia. L. REV. 356; Hankin, Validity and Constitutionality of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act (1924) i ILL. L. REv. 17, 25; Langeluttig, supra note 32, at 519; Note (1935) 44
YALE L. J. 819.
42. 211 U. S. 407 (1908).
43. However, in United States v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., 236 U. S. 318 (,915), al-
though the court denied the right of the I. C. C. to inspect the correspondence of the carrier,
the right to inspect the accounts and records was not contested, and there is no intimation
that the privilege is limited to situations involving specific breaches of the law.
44. Smith v. Interstate Commerce Comm., 245 U. S. 33 (1917), which is considered as
having overruled the Harriman case. See Handler, supra note 9, at 932.
45. Federal Trade Comm. v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U. S. 298 (1924); United
States v. Basic Products Co., 26o Fed. 472 (W. D. Pa. 1g1g) ; Federal Trade Comm. v. Bal-
timore Grain Co., 284 Fed. 886 (D. Md. 1922) ; Federal Trade Comm. v. Millers' Nat. Fed.,
23 F. (2d) 968 (App. D. C. 1927) ; Federal Trade Comm. v. Smith, 34 F. (2d) 323 (S. D.
N. Y. 1929). For a discussion of several of these cases and the problems raised thereby, see
Mechem, Fishing Expeditions by Commissions (1924) 22 MicH. L. REv. 765. With the ex-
ception of the Smith case, the courts were here dealing with attempts by the Commission to
exert its visitorial rather than its subpoena power. See supra note 4T. The language of the
courts is sufficiently broad, however, to induce the belief that the use of subpoenas duces tecum
would have been given similar treatment, and the result of the Smith case serves to substan-
tiate this belief. With these cases, consider also the decision in Jones v. Securities Exchange
Comm., 298 U. S. 1 (1936), 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1019, 49 HARv. L. REv. 1369, 34 MicH. L.
REv. 1031.
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Harriman case, is that Congress did not intend the exercise of the power in
situations of this sort, one usually can find dicta to the effect that even had Con-
gress attempted to confer the power, the attempt would have been ineffectual.
It has been pointed out that the distinction between the treatment of the Inter-
state Commerce and the Federal Trade Commissions can be traced to the element
of public interest, and that in the case of common carriers such compulsion is not
unreasonable in view of the benefit to be derived by the public from the investiga-
tions.46 Support for this proposition can be found in Federal Trade Commission
v. Snith,4 where a subpoena duces tecum, issued in the course of an inquiry
into the activities of interstate carriers of electricity, was held to constitute an
unreasonable search and seizure, the court resting its decision on the fact that no
formal complaint was being investigated and that Congress had not yet assumed
as broad control over carriers of electricity as it had over common carriers. In
contrast to these decisions adverse to the Federal Trade Commission are two
recent decisions of the lower federal courts which, in effect, upheld the power
of the Commission to compel the production of evidence when engaged in in-
vestigations undertaken pursuant to Congressional resolutions.
48
With the case law in this confused state, it is impossible to determine upon
what basis the subpoenas of a fact-finding agency will be upheld as reasonable.
Inasmuch as subpoenas issued in the course of a non-judicial investigation have
occasionally been upheld by the courts, especially in the case of common carriers,
it follows that such subpcenas are not unreasonable per se. Yet the authorities
have drawn a distinction between the compulsion of testimony to be used in
quasi-judicial activities, where a determination of legal rights is involved, and
the use of the subpoena in a purely fact-finding inquiry.49 In the former case,
the test of relevancy has been adhered to in considering possible violations of
the Fourth Amendment, the only remaining constitutional objection that seems
to impress the courts. In the latter type of investigation, however, the test has
been rejected, except where the public interest element enters, on the ground
that the broad scope of inquiry makes its application impossible.
A possible answer to this objection can be found by analogizing to the in-
vestigatory powers exerted by Congress, in respect to which the rule of relevancy
has been consistently, though most liberally, applied. An administrative com-
mission engaged in securing information to be used as a basis for future legisla-
tion is doing nothing more than Congress itself or one of its committees when
conducting a Congressional investigation. Therefore, the limitations on its fact-
finding powers should be similar to those imposed upon that branch of the
government, and the reasonableness of administrative subpcenas should be gov-
erned by the same tests applied to subpoenas issued by Congress. In its in-
vestigatory functions, Congress is limited to matters which may permit of
legislative action; there must be some legitimate legislative purpose in mind.0
46. See Watkins, An Appraisal of the Work of the Federal Trade Commission (1932)
32 CoL. L. REv. 272, 280; Note (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 81g, 837.
47. 34 F. (2d) 323 (S. D. N. Y. 1929).
48. Federal Trade Comm. v. Millers' Nat Fed., 47 F. (2d) 428 (App. D. C. 193)
(senate resolution authorizing an investigation into the production, distribution and sale of
flour and bread) ; Federal Trade Comm. v. National Biscuit Co., 18 F. Supp. 667 (S. D.
N. Y. 1937), 35 MicH. L. REv. 1380 (joint resolution of Congress authorizing investigation
into the financial and economic condition of agricultural producers). Mr. Langeluttig has
advanced the view that the validity of the demand for testimony depends upon the manner in
which the Commission received its authorization, a simple resolution of either house being
insufficient. Langeluttig, supra note 32, at 516-523. This distinction, however, seems to be
merely superficial.
49. See Langeluttig, .rpra note 32.
5o. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135 (1927). "The limitation of power of investi-
gation is that it must be germane to some matter concerning which the house conducting the
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The power to compel testimony, restricted like that of the courts by the require-
ment of relevancy,51 is thus determined by the limits of permissible Congres-
sional action on the subject being investigated. There is no reason why these
same principles should not apply to the instant problem. When Congress, by
resolution or statute, authorizes an administrative body to conduct an investiga-
tion for the purpose of collecting data to be used in enacting future legislation,
the scope of the commission's probe is doubly limited. First, it is restricted to
the single matter authorized to be investigated; and secondly, it cannot exceed
the bounds of possible Congressional action on that matter. Here, then, are two
guides for determining the relevancy of the information sought through the use
of subpcenas. The demand for documentary evidence would thus seem not to
be violative of the Fourth Amendment if the information requested is relevant
to matters within this field of permissible inquiry. Likewise, if the commission
is engaged in a fact-finding expedition with a view to the establishment of rules
and regulations, a subpoena would be equally unobjectionable if the material
desired were germane to matters over which the body could legitimately pre-
scribe such rules and regulations.
The analogy is not without defects. The restriction with respect to Con-
gress has been loosely applied, and it is possible that equal latitude would result
in the case of administrative agencies if analogous precedents were followed.
However, the restrictive requirement can always be seized upon by the courts,
and there is a strong likelihood that the laxity prevalent in tests of Congressional
subpoenas would disappear in the determination of the validity of administrative
subpoenas. A proper application of this test of relevancy to determine whether
the Fourth Amendment's requirement of "reasonableness" is satisfied at least
would provide the courts with a workable principle, thereby eliminating the
jumble of conflicting decisions that has arisen from past consideration of the
validity of administrative non-judicial inquiries. Although the range of possible
inquiry may still be much broader than that of a commission acting quasi-
judicially, the practical necessity for having an adequate fact basis for Con-
gressional legislation and administrative regulation affords a justification for
any sacrifice of privacy entailed by the extended exercise of this power of testi-
monial compulsion.52
T.P.G.
investigation has power to act (whether such action be enactment of statutes or something
else), and not a mere inquisition into the private affairs of the citizen." Seymour v. United
States, 77 F. (2d) 577, 580 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935). So loosely has this requirement been ap-
plied, however, that investigations have been upheld where the possibility of future legisla-
tion has been extremely slight. McGrain v. Daugherty, supra. In fact, only one investigation
has ever been held to exceed the power of Congress, the first of its kind to be tested by the
Supreme Court. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168 (188o). See generally, Landis, Con-
stitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation (1926) 40 HARv. L.
REV. 153.
51. In re Chapman, I66 U. S. 661 (1897) ; McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135 (1927);
Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263 (1929). The recent decision in Strawn v. Western
Union (Sup. Ct. D. C., March II, 1936), 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 904, 45 YATF L. J. 1503, seems
contrary to the established principles applied by the Supreme Court. Cf. Hearst v. Black, 87
F. (2d) 68 (App. D. C. 1936), 5o HgAv. L. REV. 354, 35 MIcH. L. REV. 1383 (1937).
52. "The view, thus, that only judicial bodies or agencies acting in a judicial capacity
require the power of testimonial compulsion can find no basis in the practical realities of mod-
em government." Handler, supra note 9, at 930.
